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The War on Drugs: 
Undermining peace 
and security 
 
The global war on drugs has been fought for 50 years, 
without preventing the long-term trend of increasing drug 
production, supply and use� But beyond this failure to 
achieve its own stated aims, the drug war has also produced 
a range of serious, negative costs� Many of these costs have 
been identified by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) – the very UN agency that oversees the 
system responsible for them – and are described as the 
‘unintended consequences’ of the war on drugs�1 They may 
have been unintended, but after more than 50 years, they 
can no longer be seen as unanticipated� These costs are also 
distinct from those relating to drug use, stemming as they do 
from the choice of a punitive enforcement-led approach�
This briefing explores how the UN seeks to promote the 
security of its member states through implementing a drug 
control system that treats the use of certain drugs as an 
‘existential threat’ to society. The briefing will demonstrate, 
however, that this approach is fatally undermining 
international peace and security�
There is naturally overlap with other areas of the Count 
the Costs project, including: development, human rights, 
health, crime and economics� For the full range of 
thematic briefings and the Alternative World Drug Report, 
see www�countthecosts�org�
Introduction
Contemporary drug prohibition has gifted such a massive 
money-making opportunity to organised crime groups that 
they have accrued a level of wealth and firepower which 
enables them to challenge the state, or even usurp its 
monopoly on legitimate violence (sometimes considered the 
definition of the state itself2). The subsequent militarisation 
of the fight against these organised crime groups has served 
only to further undermine security�
As a result, member states that implement the UN’s 
prohibition-based drug control system are effectively 
obliged to violate the organisation’s founding principle: 
the maintenance of international peace and security� 
This is not to claim that all of the security costs 
identified in this briefing arise solely because of the 
global drug war; however, the evidence shows that the 
‘threat-based’ response to certain drugs has created 
some of the world’s greatest security threats�
 
What is security?
Although ‘security’ is used differently in a variety of 
fields and contexts, in general, it is the concept that the 
state and its citizens require protection from threats� The 
maintenance of security occurs at different scales – human, 
citizen or public security focus on protection against threats 
to individuals, while national security refers to protection 
against threats to nation states and their institutions, 
and regional and international security to protection of 
international structures and organisations, such as the 
UN or European Union. This briefing primarily focuses on 
threats to international and national security� 
Two distinct drug wars 
undermine security
Governments justify global prohibition by claiming that 
the non-medical use of certain drugs (excluding alcohol 
and tobacco) represents a grave threat to humankind; 
that users and suppliers constitute ‘existential threats’ 
to security; and that a punitive approach is the only 
way to provide protection for citizens� An international 
relations theory describes this as ‘securitisation’�3 4  
This threat-based approach is underpinned by the three 
UN drug conventions. The Preamble to the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs starts by placing 
drugs in a health and welfare framework: ‘Concerned 
with the health and welfare of mankind…’ But quickly 
asserts that member states have a duty to treat them as 
a threat: ‘Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs 
constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught 
with social and economic danger to mankind … Conscious 
of their duty to prevent and combat this evil…’5
The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances then identifies the 
threat posed by the criminal organisations involved in 
the illicit drug trade: ‘Recognizing the links between illicit 
traffic and other related organized criminal activities 
which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten 
the stability, security and sovereignty of States�’6
So, as the two conventions clearly articulate, there 
are in reality two distinct drug wars being fought, 
in parallel. The first is the fight against addiction, 
which criminalises those who use, supply or produce 
certain drugs for non-medical purposes� 
UK anti-drug operation in Afghanistan, 2009  
(photo credit: Cpl Rupert Frere RLC)
3On its website, the UNODC described how the process 
of enforcing prohibition creates regional insecurity:
‘Global drug control efforts have had a dramatic 
unintended consequence: a criminal black market 
of staggering proportions. Organized crime is a 
threat to security� Criminal organizations have the 
power to destabilize society and Governments� 
The illicit drug business is worth billions of 
dollars a year, part of which is used to corrupt 
government officials and to poison economies. 
‘Drug cartels are spreading violence in Central America, 
Mexico and the Caribbean. West Africa is under attack 
from narco-trafficking. Collusion between insurgents and 
criminal groups threatens the stability of West Asia, the 
Andes and parts of Africa, fuelling the trade in smuggled 
weapons, the plunder of natural resources and piracy�’8
A similar conclusion was reached by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in their 2012 report 
‘Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of 
Prohibition’.9 As Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational 
Threats and Political Risk at IISS, and former Deputy Head 
of the UK’s MI6 Special Intelligence Service, commented:
‘The so-called war on drugs has created a significant 
threat to international security��� producer and 
transit countries [governments]���face the unenviable 
choice between allowing their institutions to 
become corrupted���or embarking upon what is 
effectively a civil war in order to defeat them�’
Reports from the UNODC and UN Security Council – 
which is charged with identifying and responding to 
security threats – show that illicit drug production 
and trafficking cover vast regions of the world. The 
Security Council has also concluded that this illicit 
trade poses a threat to international security:
‘The Security Council notes with concern the serious 
threats posed in some cases by drug trafficking 
and related transnational organized crime to 
However, it was an entirely predictable outcome that 
this prohibition would result in control of the drug 
trade defaulting to criminal entrepreneurs, given the 
persistently high demand for drugs� The second drug war 
is fought against these criminals who are enriched by the 
proceeds of the initial prohibition to the point where they 
threaten the security of the state and its citizens� Using 
increasingly militarised enforcement to try to eliminate 
these entrepreneurs, and the illicit market in which 
they operate, then further undermines security via a 
combination of interlinked direct and indirect impacts�
The UNODC’s World Drug Report 2008 describes five major 
‘unintended consequences’ of the global drug control 
system�7 Three of these have a negative impact on security: 
firstly the creation of a huge criminal market that supports 
the organised crime and insurgent groups that control 
it; secondly, the displacement of resources from health 
to enforcement; and thirdly, the ‘balloon effect’, which 
describes how enforcement, rather than eliminating the 
drug problem, often merely displaces it to new locations 
– like air moving around in a squeezed balloon. 
“  Impunity and ungovernability pose 
a challenge to the collective security 
and well-being of any State ... When 
state structures become involved 
with and affected by violence and 
systemic corruption, drug trafficking 
can further weaken the efficacy of 
Governments to the point of creating 
‘failed State’ conditions at the 
national or subregional level.”
International Narcotics Control Board
2016
international security in different regions of the world, 
including in Africa� The increasing link, in some 
cases, between drug trafficking and the financing of 
terrorism, is also a source of growing concern�’10
What it has failed to do, however, is to then apply 
the UNODC’s analysis showing that this illicit drug 
production and trafficking is the inevitable consequence 
of prohibiting a global trade with hundreds of 
millions of consumers� Combining these two analyses 
would have identified the UN drug control system 
itself as a threat to international security�
The UN drug control system undermines the security of UN member states
The UNODC openly acknowledges that the enforcement-led UN drug control system creates the criminal drug market, 
meaning the system itself is effectively the cause of illicit drug production and trafficking globally. In turn, among 
many others, the UNODC,13 UN Security Council,14 15 and the US Presidential Determination for 201516 have identified 
this illicit trade as a cause of insecurity in over 60 countries across the globe. As a result, maps (such as those opposite) 
that illustrate global flows of illicit drugs in the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2015 also inadvertently reveal where 
national, regional and international security is compromised or threatened by drug production and trafficking.17 
While many of the places negatively affected – such as Central and South America, West Africa, and South East Asia 
– are perhaps no surprise, even countries with large financial sectors like the UK may be threatened indirectly by the 
corrupting effects of laundering drug money�18
Countries whose security is compromised by the UN drug control system
Asia 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran, 
Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Thailand
North America 
USA, Mexico
Central America 
Honduras, Costa Rica, Belize, El 
Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua
South America 
Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay
Caribbean 
Haiti, Dominican Republic, The Bahamas, Jamaica
It would also demonstrate that the UN itself is now 
overseeing a war that is seriously undermining one of the 
key pillars of its work –  peace and security – and Article 
One of its own founding constitution, the UN Charter, 
and indeed its raison d’être, which is: ‘To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace�’11 Instead, the UN Security 
Council has chosen to interpret the UNODC analysis, and 
its own evidence, as a prescription not for change, but for 
redoubled efforts�12 
West Africa 
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Gambia, Togo, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria
Sahel 
Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea
East and South Africa 
Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, South Africa
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Other 
Albania, Russia, UK
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integrity of the state itself� Citizens’ faith in the state is 
undermined, which can also increase insecurity�19 
As they grow in influence, DTOs and TOCs are particularly 
drawn to fragile states that are already struggling to 
provide security for their citizens� Here, the corruption, 
instability and conflict associated with the illicit 
drug trade is amplified by existing poor governance. 
Apart from a few cases where the state and its elites 
successfully collude with DTOs and TOCs to maintain a 
functioning state – such as in Burma20 and Tajikistan21 
– effective governance is rare in very corrupt states, 
and can further exacerbate conditions for conflict.
Throughout Latin America, but also in Central Asia 
and West Africa, long-running civil wars and decades 
of poor governance have been exacerbated by the war 
on drugs. An estimated 95% of illicit drug production 
occurs in such areas, and trafficking from and across 
them is made easier by their chaotic environment�22
The security costs of 
the war on drugs
1� Creating a criminal market of 
staggering proportions
The sheer size and financial power of the illegal drugs 
industry can undermine legitimate governments 
everywhere, generating lucrative funding streams for 
drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), transnational 
organised crime groups (TOCs) and, some evidence 
suggests, insurgent and terrorist groups�
A strong state is recognised as one that holds the monopoly 
on legitimate force, alongside other key responsibilities, 
such as being able to provide procedural justice; a 
recognised system – usually democratic – of government; 
a fair allocation of resources; and a sense of identity and 
citizenship� The drug war undermines these elements 
of good governance by creating corruption, violence 
and conflict, which can allow non-state actors such 
as DTOs, TOCs and insurgent groups to create parallel 
structures of power and capability that can threaten the 
“  So long as there is an insistent 
market in a country like the United 
States for illegal narcotics and a 
sufficient profit to be made, they will 
probably be produced. And so long 
as they are illegal, their production 
and distribution will be through 
organized crime.”
Ambassador David Passage
former Director of Andean Affairs, 
US State Department
2000
Schoolchildren fleeing drug-related violence in Tijuana, Mexico
(Photo credit: Knight Foundation)
7Corruption and impunity
Public servants around the world who are supposed to 
be enforcing the drug control regime are often the most 
susceptible to corruption, simply because they control the 
mechanisms to which criminal gangs need access in order 
to carry out their trade. From low-level police officers to 
high-ranking politicians and the military, individuals are 
routinely corrupted, through bribery or threats, to either 
Afghanistan: a study in insecurity
‘You cannot carry a war on drugs because, again, if you look at the literature on Latin America, Central America, and 
particularly Mexico... the lesson that is fundamental, [is that] those are failures.’23 
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2015
Afghanistan faces many security challenges, and has a long history of involvement in the global opium trade� Despite 
poppy eradication being one of the stated aims of the coalition invasion in 2001,24 opium production increased dramatically 
during the war. Today it supplies more than 90% of global illicit opium/heroin,25 which is fuelling unprecedented 
corruption, as well as funding insurgency, and terror groups, both nationally and internationally� It is important to 
exercise caution here, however, as governments have been quick to point to terrorist groups – for example, Al Qaeda 
–  being funded by drugs when this was later shown not to be the case.26
• The UNODC estimates that in 2014:27
• Opiates accounted for 13% of Afghanistan’s GDP and considerably exceeded the export value of licit goods 
and services. This is down from 42% in 2008, but due to the expansion of the licit economy, rather than a 
contraction in opium production
• The total area of opium poppy cultivation was 224,000 hectares in 2014, a 7% increase from the previous year. 
In Helmand province, opium accounted for almost 30% of the total area of agricultural land. Potential opium 
production was 6,400 tons, an increase of 17% from its 2013 level, and the second highest since 1994 
• The UN Security Council estimates the Taliban earn $90-160 million annually from opium/heroin production, 
10-15% of their overall funding. This is substantial, but represents only 3% of the annual harvest sale.28 Far more 
money goes to corrupt officials, traffickers and farmers
• Afghan government officials are believed to be involved in at least 70% of opium trafficking, and at least 13 former 
or present provincial governors are directly involved in the drug trade29 
turn a blind eye to, or actively participate in, illicit activity� 
They are rarely brought to trial, prosecuted or punished� In 
Mexico, the death toll from drug-market-related violence 
has risen to over 100,000 since 2006, with more than 40% 
of the bodies remaining unidentified and little justice 
for the affected families or redress from the state�30 This 
corruption and impunity corrodes the state’s ability to 
govern effectively, and undermines the rule of law�31 
• As the escape of Sinaloa drug cartel leader Joaquin 
‘El Chapo’ Guzman Loera from a Mexican jail in 
July 2015 showed, corruption reaches all levels of 
the justice system. So far, seven prison officers have 
been charged with complicity in the escape34
• Afghanistan, already a fragile state, has been 
severely undermined by corruption and the 
profits from the illicit drugs trade. The police and 
intelligence services regularly kill and torture with 
impunity� Corruption is so rampant that a bribe is 
paid for every service – whether to secure access 
to electricity or purchase a highly valued public 
sector job, even within the judicial system35
 
Violence and conflict
In the absence of formal regulation – such as legal contract 
enforcement, financial reporting, and the establishment 
of trades unions, for example – violence and intimidation 
have become the default regulatory tools for TOCs and 
DTOs wishing to protect and expand their illicit-market 
interests� To do so, cartels equip private armies and 
militias that are in many cases able to outgun local and 
state enforcement. Organised criminal networks can 
also finance or merge with separatist and insurgent 
groups, and illicit drug profits can become a key source of 
funding for domestic and international terror groups� 
It might seem logical, in the light of the violence perpetuated 
by DTOs and TOCs, that enforcement responses directed at 
these groups would increase security and reduce conflict, 
but this is rarely the case� An overview of research into 
enforcement crackdowns found overwhelmingly that 
such market disruption increases levels of violence� This 
occurs not just because of increased violence between 
criminal groups and security forces, but also between 
and within criminal groups, when enforcement action 
creates a power vacuum, and corresponding opportunities 
to seize illicit market share or territory�36 Inevitably, 
ordinary people are often caught in the crossfire. 
The vast amounts of money generated by the criminal 
market also has a destabilising and corrupting effect on 
financial systems. A 2015 UK Treasury report estimated that 
2.7% of global GDP, or $1.6 trillion, was laundered in 2009, 
much of which will have come from the drugs trade� The 
report concluded that both money laundering itself, and 
the criminality which drives the need to launder money, 
presents a significant risk to the UK’s national security and 
fuels political instability in key partner countries� The drug 
trade, which largely generates proceeds in the form of cash, 
poses a high risk of money laundering, which is in turn 
a key enabler of serious and organised crime, which has 
estimated social and economic costs of £24 billion a year�32 
Large parts of South and Central America now experience 
endemic illicit-drug-related corruption� The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, for example, 
has recognised the corrosive influence of criminal 
funds as a problem for the whole Latin American 
region, stating that in various countries, ‘corruption 
and impunity have enabled criminal organisations to 
develop and establish parallel power structures�’33 
Unsurprisingly, the countries most closely involved 
in the production or transit of illicit drugs fare 
badly in Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index: Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, 
for example, sit close to the bottom, while Mexico 
and Colombia are also heavily criticised�
“  The illicit drug economy threatens 
security and development in countries 
already stricken by poverty and 
instability, but its deadly tentacles 
penetrate every country on 
the planet.”
United Nations on Drugs and Crime
2001
9State violence
Security is being undermined in many countries by 
the violence perpetrated by police and security forces, 
either at the direct instruction of governments, or 
indirectly as a result of drug-war-related policies�
• A report by the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the 
Colombia-Europe-US Human Rights Observatory 
has discovered a positive correlation between 
US military assistance (which has been a feature 
of Colombia’s response to its drug problem) and 
extrajudicial killings, particularly when ‘moderate’ 
amounts of funding are received� Multiple killings 
were committed by soldiers in a higher percentage 
of units commanded by US-trained officers than 
by a random sample of military officers46 
Mexico: where drug-war violence knows no bounds 
 
While Mexico has a long history of internal violence, this was in decline until 2006, when President Calderon 
announced an intensification of enforcement efforts against the illicit drug trade, with a focus on eliminating the 
leaders of the country’s drug cartels. This so-called ‘decapitation strategy’ has been – and still is – having severe 
negative consequences, with Mexico suffering an extreme upswing in violence. As cartel leaders were removed37 and a 
power vacuum created, their organisations fractured into smaller factions battling each other for territory, while other 
cartels moved in to seize control, along with state security forces�38 Estimates of deaths from violence related to the 
illegal drug trade in Mexico since the war on drugs was scaled up in 2006 range from 60,000 to more than 120,000,39 40 
of which at least 1,300 were children and 4,000 women. From 2007 to 2014, total civilian homicide deaths in Mexico 
were 164,000 – a substantially higher number than in Iraq or Afghanistan over the same period.41
These increasingly brutal murders are also designed to intimidate competitors and generate fear, with murders and 
torture being filmed and posted online, or the bodies left in public places.42 This strategy is not restricted to Mexican drug 
gangs; a study on drug dealing and retaliation in St Louis, Missouri, in the US, found that direct and violent retaliation was 
used to serve three functions: ‘reputation maintenance, loss recovery and vengeance�’43 Such actions further increase 
insecurity and normalise violence at levels that destroy communities and deter legitimate economic activity�
Mexico’s drug war is also fuelling the illegal arms trade, flooding the country with unregistered weapons, which 
inevitably leads to greater violent conflict. It has been estimated that up to 90% of these weapons come across the 
border from the US�44 In 2009, the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives discovered large quantities 
of AK-47-style rifles were being shipped to Mexico, one of which was linked to the killing of a US border guard.45
“  Mexico’s police and armed services 
are known to be contaminated by 
multimillion dollar bribes from the 
transnational narco-trafficking 
... it is widely considered to have 
attained the status of a national 
security threat.”
Transparency International
2001
• A Global Drug Policy Observatory report on 
the militarisation of counter-narcotic police in 
Central America showed that, in Honduras alone, 
between January 2011 and November 2012, 149 
civilians were murdered by their police force47
• In 2003, the Thai government launched a drug 
war crackdown, the first three months of which 
saw 2,800 extrajudicial killings. These were 
not investigated and the perpetrators were not 
prosecuted or punished. The Thai Office of the 
Narcotics Control Board admitted in 2007 that 
1,400 of the people killed had no link to drugs48
• In 2015, the Indonesian government mooted a 
revival of their ‘shoot to kill’ policy for dealing with 
drug smugglers and dealers, which it described 
as ‘ruthless’. Opponents point out this would 
contravene the Indonesian constitution49
• As many as 1,000 executions occur worldwide for 
drug offences each year, but precise numbers are 
unknown� Statistics for China are most uncertain, 
with estimates of executions for all offences in 2007 
varying from 2,000 to 15,000�50 Iran has seen a rapid 
increase – 800 in 2015 alone.51 The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office says: ‘Iran continues to have the 
highest execution rate per capita in the world … The 
death penalty was imposed largely for drug offences’52
 
Funding and arming insurgents, terrorists and separatists
The extent of the links between the global drug 
war and funding for non-state actors – the so-called 
‘drugs-terror’ nexus – is hotly disputed.53 However, 
it would be hard to argue against the claim that in 
some circumstances the effect of the criminal market 
goes beyond merely undermining the state, to directly 
competing with it by giving non-state actors access to a 
rich source of funding� It is highly likely, given the vast 
sums of money generated by the criminal drug trade, 
and the fact that much of it is laundered through the 
legal global banking system,54 that illicit drug profits 
are funding efforts to undermine multiple states�
The drug war, and in particular its crop eradication tactics, 
has also been accused of pushing people off the land and 
towards insurgent groups. Richard Holbrooke, then US 
Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, admitted that 
opium poppy eradication alienated ‘poor farmers ��� growing 
the best cash crop they could … in a market where they 
couldn’t get others things to market’, with the result that, 
‘we were driving people into the hands of the Taliban�’55 
Relationships between insurgents and drug trafficking 
groups can flourish despite there being strong, often 
ideological, differences between them,56 as with the 
Marxist revolutionary FARC in Colombia, who have 
consistently used drug production and trafficking to fund 
their operations�57 In addition, the smuggling networks 
of DTOs and TOCs can be used by insurgents to transport 
weapons, or be taxed to raise cash. As long ago as the 
1980s, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry, 
described the Maoist insurgency group The Shining Path 
as ‘narco-terrorists’, alleging that they were involved in 
drug production and trafficking.58 More recently, it was 
discovered that, in Brazil, smuggling networks associated 
with the illegal drug trade were supporting a parallel 
criminal market economy in consumer goods that was 
costing the nation over $10 billion in lost tax revenues.59
It is important to note, however, that the extent of the 
‘drugs-terror nexus’ may sometimes be exaggerated for 
political or economic reasons� Authorities may wish to 
blame criminal drug activity on insurgent groups in order 
to increase their own law enforcement funding, or as a 
distraction from their own illicit activities. For example, 
research initially suggested that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) and other Islamist groups in West Africa 
have been using cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking and 
kidnapping to provide them with funds, but news reports 
of this were overstated or unsubstantiated. AQIM may be 
providing armed escorts to cocaine traffickers for a fee 
of between 10-15% of the value of the drug,60 an activity 
that could have netted them up to $65 million since 2008 
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and helped them to become a serious political force�61 
However, this forms only a part of their funding stream�62 63
Drug profits in West Africa 
weakening the state
In Mali, where Islamist fighters seized control of 
the north in 2012, drug trafficking has exacerbated 
the conflict. A 2013 UN Security Council report on 
West Africa and the Sahel recognised the impact 
of corruption from drug trafficking as a factor that 
contributed to state weakness in countries within the 
region, notably Mali and Guinea-Bissau�64
In June 2015, Mali’s foreign minister, Abdoulaye 
Diop, called on the UN to provide a peacekeeping 
force to help regain control from the militias and 
for a major anti-drug trafficking operation to be put 
in place, because he argued: ‘We will never achieve 
a definite settlement for this crisis without this 
initiative because drugs are fuelling all sides in this 
conflict.’65 Mali therefore found itself calling for the 
UN to send in forces to deal with a problem that was 
being simultaneously fuelled by the UN-administered 
global drug control regime�  
2� Displacing resources toward   
enforcement
Greater funding for the militarisation of drug law 
enforcement can starve vital social programmes of the 
resources and focus they need� This so-called ‘policy 
displacement’66 results in domestic and international drug 
control interventions and aid resources being heavily 
skewed towards military and law enforcement solutions, 
rather than policies focusing on improving development, 
health and human rights. Just as a balanced programme 
of spending to benefit all citizens contributes to security, 
so an unbalanced programme that favours weapons over 
access to education, healthcare and economic opportunities, 
undermines security�
On a national level, this is perhaps best seen in the US, 
where the threat-based approach and harsh sentencing 
for drugs offences has resulted in the disproportionate 
mass incarceration of people from poor areas� The 
prison industry has swollen, in both financial and 
human resources terms, while many urban centres 
are left to decay without adequate investment, 
with few jobs outside the criminal economy� 
The numbers are staggering: America’s prison and jail 
population has increased sevenfold from 1970 until today, 
from some 300,000 people to 2.2 million – the largest prison 
population in the world. With less than 5% of the world’s 
inhabitants – the US has about 25% of its prisoners.67 
Internationally, resources can be similarly skewed to 
focus on enforcement and punishment. Since the 1980s, 
the US has instigated a series of aid programmes – such 
as the Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative – that focus specifically on bolstering the 
ability of military and law enforcement agencies in the 
region to reduce the supply of drugs into the US. One 
of the major drivers behind these programmes was the 
alleged threat to the US’s national security, rather than 
the actual needs of the populations receiving aid�68
In 1999, Colombia’s President Andrés Pastrana requested 
US assistance in addressing the country’s drug problem, 
and emphasised the need to prioritise development and 
social programmes over law enforcement and military 
agendas� But the US wanted the focus to remain on drug 
war approaches: of the $860 million given to Colombia, 
$632 million went on security agencies and only $227 
million was earmarked for economic development and 
other social priorities�69 Security spending has increased 
massively in Colombia since the beginning of Plan Colombia, 
with the US spending about $8 billion,70 and from 2000-09 
Colombia’s defence spending nearly tripled to $12 billion.71 
In 2000, President Bill Clinton urged Congress to support 
the plan by emphasising the national security of both 
Colombia and the US� He argued that: ‘Colombia’s drug 
traffickers directly threaten America’s security’.72 While 
things have improved in Colombia, the results of fighting 
the drug war remain overwhelmingly disastrous: murders 
and kidnappings remain high,73 the number of internally 
displaced persons has barely altered,74 the amount of 
cocaine entering the US has not decreased,75 and coca 
production in Colombia rose from 48,000 hectares in 2013 to 
69,000 hectares in 2014.76 
• Coca production has repeatedly shifted 
between Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, as a 
response to localised enforcement efforts78
• In recent years, as enforcement disrupted established 
drug trafficking routes from Latin America via 
the Caribbean to Europe, West Africa has become 
a new transshipment point for cocaine� This has 
had a hugely destabilising effect on an already 
vulnerable part of the world and is undermining 
security at state, regional and international levels79
• As Colombians started to regain control over their 
country and crack down on TOCs and DTOs, the 
violence and corruption moved to Mexico. It has 
been argued that, in turn, the best Mexico can hope 
to achieve is to apply pressure to  the cartels so that 
they move elsewhere. To some extent, this appears 
to have happened, with Mexican cartels setting up 
operations in Central American countries such as 
Guatemala80 and Honduras,81 which are even less 
well equipped to cope with them than Mexico
 
“  Because drug cartels control such 
immense amounts of money, they now 
have the power to influence politics 
and business at the highest levels and 
gain control of entire regions.”
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
2010
3� How the balloon effect 
impacts on security
The last of the UNODC’s ‘unintended consequences’ of 
the war on drugs that specifically impacts on security 
is the balloon effect�77 This has serious implications for 
national and international security, because DTOs will 
successively target alternative regions; as enforcement 
efforts encroach on their territory, they simply move 
elsewhere� This means the negative impacts of the drug 
war and illicit trade are spreading across multiple regions, 
and present an ongoing threat to any fragile state or area 
that could be used for drug production or trafficking.
“  We are now helping other countries, 
the Caribbean countries, Central 
American countries, Mexico, because 
our success means more problems for 
them ... There is the balloon effect.”
 
Juan Manuel Santos
President of Colombia
2010
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Two parallel UN drug control systems: only one creates war and insecurity
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs created parallel drug control systems: one that treats 
some drugs as a threat, the other that treats some of the same drugs as resources to be traded�
Drug war 1: created by  
1961 UN Single Convention 
 
The state criminalises non-medical drug users, 
suppliers and producers to combat the “evil 
of addiction” through global prohibition
 
Massive criminal market created
 
Organised crime groups accrue wealth 
and firepower to threaten states
 
Drug war 2: created by 1988 UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Drugs
 
Targets transnational organised crime groups
 
Further militarisation creates more conflict and 
violence, spreads it to more countries without 
reducing the global criminal drugs market
 
Drug war 1 and 2 fought harder with same results
 
Increasing conflict and insecurity
Regulated medical drug trade:  
created by 1961 UN Single Convention 
 
The state licenses farmers/pharmaceutical 
companies to produce and manufacture drugs, 
and doctors and pharmacists to supply users 
 
Legally regulated market created 
 
No disruption of peace and security
Are there benefits?
For citizens in countries where corruption is endemic 
and where the state is fragile or absent, some stability 
(at least in the short term) can be provided by a 
combination of state apparatus and the power and 
largesse of organised crime groups working together, 
as occurs in places such as Burma82 and Tajikistan�83   
For those states seeking to achieve security primarily 
through a militarised response to existential threats, the 
global drug war provides ample opportunities to wield 
military and police power� However, the evidence is clear 
that this does not provide any long-term security benefits, 
and more commonly achieves the exact opposite. 
How to count the costs?
When the UNODC identified the five major ‘unintended 
consequences’ of enforcing the UN drug control system in 
2008, the question of whether the intended consequences 
outweighed the unintended ones arose� That question 
is only now beginning to be seriously debated at the 
international level� Because of the gravity of the harms 
created by the drug control system, it is incumbent upon 
all UN member states to have systems in place to measure 
positive and negative outcomes, in order to assess overall 
effectiveness, and for the relevant UN agencies to collate 
these responses in order to provide a global picture of 
costs against benefits. Indicators relating to the three 
pillars of the UN – peace and security, development and 
human rights – are currently almost absent from this 
scrutiny, throwing into doubt the claim that the drug 
control system has any meaningful evidence base at all� 
Peace and security is absolutely fundamental to the 
workings of the UN, and identifying indicators that assess 
security impacts of drug control efforts is an essential 
part of this� In the absence of such indicators, member 
states are doomed to repeat the failings of the past�
 
Conclusions
Illicit drug production and trafficking has not appeared 
from nowhere; it is a direct consequence of global 
prohibition in the context of rising demand, and the 
increasingly threat-based enforcement responses 
adopted by member states, with the tacit approval of 
the UN drug control agencies. But while people who use 
drugs have never been a genuine threat to society, the 
criminal entrepreneurs profiting from the illicit market 
that supplies them under prohibition, are now genuinely 
putting society in jeopardy. As a result, the UN now faces 
a major international security threat of its own making� 
“  From UNDPA’s perspective and in 
light of the increasingly destabilizing 
effect of transnational organized 
crime and drug trafficking on state 
and regional security, Member States 
may wish to hold a discussion on the 
possibility of including the peace and 
security implications of this threat … 
to exchange ideas and lessons learned 
on what has and has not worked in 
addressing the world drug problem, 
with implications for the work of the 
United Nations across its three pillars 
– namely development, human rights, 
and peace and security.”
 
United Nations Department of Political Affairs
2015
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A growing number of governments are beginning to 
recognise that this is the case. At the UN Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs in 2009, Ecuador described its 
approach as a: ‘De-securitisation of drug policy 
which allows us to address the problem from the 
perspective of health and human rights’�84 
However, not only are many countries moving away 
from enforcement-led approaches with regard to drug 
users, supply-side reforms that reduce the illicit trade – 
and accompanying security threat – are also becoming 
a reality. The then president of Uruguay, José Mujica, 
for example, has stated that the decision to establish a 
government-controlled cannabis market, ‘began essentially 
as a security issue’�85 Evidence of the impacts on security 
of such reforms should be increasingly apparent as 
more US states, and other countries follow Uruguay in 
legally regulating cannabis, and shifting from a threat-
based to a health and human rights-based approach� 
Rather than viewing drug trafficking in isolation of 
its policy context, the UN Security Council should, 
using the UNODC’s analysis, categorise the punitive 
enforcement-based drug control system as a threat 
to international peace and security� And all member 
states must, as a matter of urgency, review the security 
impacts of the drug war domestically and internationally, 
if true peace and stability is to be realised�
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